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Abstract 
Concerns over accuracy, availability, integrity, and continuity 
have limited the integration of Global Positioning System 
(GPS) and Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) 
for safety-critical applications.   More recent augmentation 
systems, such as the European Geostationary Navigation 
Overlay Service (EGNOS) and the North American Wide 
Area Augmentation System (WAAS) have begun to address 
these concerns.  Augmentation architectures build on the 
existing GPS/GLONASS infrastructures to support location-
based services in Safety of Life (SoL) applications.  Much of 
the technical development has been directed by air traffic 
management requirements, in anticipation of the more 
extensive support to be offered by GPS III and Galileo.  
WAAS has already been approved to provide vertical 
guidance for aviation applications.   During the next twelve 
months, the full certification of EGNOS for SoL applications 
is expected.  This paper discusses similarities and differences 
between the safety assessment techniques used in Europe and 
North America.  
1 Introduction 
Navigational aids have been integrated into a broad range of 
safety-related applications.   For example, a recent accident 
report described the standard navigational aids on board a 
fishing vessel equipped for a crew of three: a radar, an echo 
sounder, a watch keepers’ alarm, and an autopilot. The fishing 
vessel also carried two GPS plotters and a GPS receiver 
(Maritime New Zealand, 2004). The subsequent investigation 
found that the vessel had run aground because the skipper had 
not set waypoints but had instead been using the cursor on 
one of the GPS plotters to keep an informal note of course 
and position.  Pilots, mariners and drivers have placed undue 
confidence in GPS and GLONASS1 applications (Johnson, 
Shea and Holloway, 2008).    
 
Security concerns have also limited the integration of GNSS 
into safety-related applications.   It is relatively easy to jam 
                                                          
1 For the remainder of this paper GNSS will be used to refer to GPS 
and GLONASS together. 
low powered transmissions.  First generation infrastructures 
lack authentication mechanisms.  This makes them vulnerable 
to spoofing through the broadcast of fake signals or through 
rebroadcast of valid GNSS signals.   
 
Other problems stem from the inherent inaccuracies within 
first generation satellite-based navigation systems (Johnson 
and Atencia Yepez, 2010).  These arise from satellite 
geometry.   For example, if all the satellites are closely 
grouped together then the benefits of differential signal 
processing will be reduced.  Gravitational forces create subtle 
changes in the orbit of the satellites within a GNSS 
constellation.  Multipath errors arise when the signals arriving 
at a receiver are reflected from large structures including 
buildings. Atmospheric effects are also important.  Radio 
waves can be considered to travel at the speed of light in outer 
space.  However, this is reduced in the ionosphere (80-
400km) where the ionizing effects of solar radiation form 
layers that refract electromagnetic waves from satellite 
transmissions.   Each GNSS message exchange helps to 
synchronize the receiver’s clock.  However, clock 
inaccuracies lead to an error of around 2 meters with an 
additional 1 meter being due to rounding and calculation 
problems.    Relativistic effects can arise when GPS satellites 
move at more than 12,000 km/h relative to the receivers.  
Time also moves more slowly in stronger gravitational fields 
and satellites are exposed to a much weaker gravitational 
force than earth-bound receivers.    
 
Regulators have responded to these concerns by placing strict 
limits on the use of GNSS in safety-related applications.  The 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has drafted 
the following Required Navigation Performance parameters:  
 
 Accuracy.  How correct is the position estimate;  
 Integrity.  The largest position error that might arise 
without detection; 
 Availability.  How often can the systems be used within 
the desired levels of Accuracy and Integrity; 
 Continuity.  The probability that an operation once 
commenced can be completed. 
 
In North America, the WAAS Satellite Based Augmentation 
System has already been approved to provide vertical 
guidance against these criteria in aviation applications.   
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100036829 2019-08-30T12:42:39+00:00Z
During the next twelve months, the full certification of 
EGNOS for SoL applications is expected.  This papers use 
these architectures to illustrate key concepts behind the safety 
of augmentation-based-GNSS that provide a stepping stone to 
next generation architectures, including Galileo and GPS III.   
 
EGNOS uses a network of approximately 40 ground stations 
and 3 geostationary satellites.  The ground stations compare 
known information about the time and location with the 
signals received from the satellites to derive error 
measurements.   This information is collated by four master 
stations that broadcast corrections using the geostationary 
network.   End users then apply these corrections to location 
information derived from the GNSS networks.  The net effect 
is to improve accuracy from 17-20 meters to around 2 meters 
in the augmented approach.  Continuity is supported by the 
use of redundancy; each of the four master stations rotates 
from being active to serve as either hot or cold-back-up.    
The WAAS architecture exploits a similar combination of 
ground stations and satellite correction broadcasts with 
similar improvements in horizontal and vertical accuracy. 
 
2. Safety-Assessments for GNSS Infrastructures 
 
The Probability of Hazardously Misleading Information 
(PHMI) is an important metric for the certification of 
augmentation systems (Blanch, Walter and Enge, 2007).  This 
metric measures the likelihood that the information contained 
in a navigation message leads to a position error larger than a 
particular error bound, known as the protection level. The 
Safety of Life (SoL) user can then assess the risk that the 
accuracy falls below the threshold and thus determine 
whether or not it is ‘safe’ to rely on location services.    
 
For instance, the FAA maintains that WAAS will alert 
aircrew within 6-8 seconds, depending on the airborne 
equipment, whenever the input signal for positioning becomes 
unusable.  The PHMI must be less than 1E-07 for the 
specified vertical and horizontal protection levels (FAA, 
2010).    
 
 
 
Figure 1: Integrity threats to satellite-based augmentation systems 
 
Figure 1 (Fernow, 2005) provides an overview of the various 
sources of error in satellite-based augmentation system 
(SBAS) architectures, including signal errors from the space 
based components through to hardware and software failures 
on the ground based segments.  Mitigations must be 
introduced to ensure that the SBAS infrastructure remains 
within the PHMI limits established by the regulators. 
 
2.1 Analysing Error Distributions   
 
The safety assessment for SBAS architectures has been driven 
by a need to over-bound range error distributions.  As 
mentioned, EGNOS and WAAS rely on ground stations to 
estimate satellite ranging errors that are then used to 
broadcast corrections to mobile users. These corrections 
cannot easily anticipate errors that have a different impact on 
the fixed ground stations compared with mobile end users.  
The SBAS, therefore, also broadcasts confidence limits on 
navigation accuracy that try to over-bound these less 
predictable errors.   End-users apply this information to 
calculate an ‘error buffer’ around their estimated location.   
 
The calculation of the confidence interval falls into two 
different tasks. First, it is necessary to identify the core of the 
error distribution that represents possible biases under routine 
operations.  Secondly, it is necessary to identify the tails of 
the distribution.  These small probabilities are in the order of 
10-7 (Rife, Walter and Blanch, 2004).  They represent 
receiver dependent errors that are the result of less predictable 
effects including ionospheric and tropospheric gradients, 
radio interference etc.   
 
Computing range error distributions is complicated by a lack 
of operational data.  Regulatory organisations have, therefore, 
commissioned studies to gather evidence about the core and 
the tails of the error distributions experienced by aviation 
users.  Further problems arise because it is hard to distinguish 
between different sources of error in direct observations.    
This is necessary to determine which hazards can be predicted 
during particular operational conditions.   
 
If a source of error can be anticipated then mitigations can be 
introduced to exclude it from the PHMI. The WAAS PHMI 
cannot be averaged over conditions that are unknown but 
constant or repeatable over time (Blanch, Walter and Enge, 
2007).  In addition, the WAAS teams used analytical 
techniques to characterise the tails of the error distribution.  
This introduced elements of subjectivity: domain experts had 
to identify the threat mechanisms that could contribute to low 
probability events.  The limited amount of direct data meant 
that extrapolation was used throughout the analysis.   The 
resulting threat models covered ionospheric errors, 
tropospheric delays, and multipath issues.  The intention was 
to place a bound on the worst case impact of these threats and 
to assign probabilities to them. 
 
2.2 Risk Assessments 
 
In addition to the position and range errors from secondary 
effects, such as tropospheric gradients, it was also necessary 
to identify the failure modes that might affect WAAS and 
EGNOS architectures.  These included software errors as well 
as hardware/processor failures for the ground based stations.    
 
In both the United States and in Europe, Failure Modes 
Effects Analysis was used to support hazard identification. 
Fault Trees then helped to assess mitigations.  There are, 
however, contrasts between the safety assessment methods 
used in both projects.   For example, the EGNOS team took 
steps to mitigate human errors that might lead to a loss of 
integrity (Johnson and Atencia Yepez, 2010).  The WAAS 
team did not explicitly include maintenance failures within 
their systems level fault tree analysis: “WAAS design is such 
that the WAAS operator and maintainer cannot cause HMI”  
(Fernow, 2005).  These risk assessments were supported by 
the static analysis of PHMI algorithms.  These studies 
identified a number of what the EGNOS team termed ‘feared 
events’ and the WAAS groups called ‘system threats’ 
(Fernow, 2005).    Threat models and detection algorithms 
were developed for each of the hazards.  These were then 
used to drive an estimation of their contribution to the PHMI.   
 
2.3 Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
 
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) provides 
techniques for mitigating many of the hazards that can arise 
for GNSS architectures.  Europe Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) requirements AMC 20-4 and JAA TGL10 and 
ICAO’s Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) Manual, Doc 
9613 have encouraged the use of RAIM when satellite based 
systems provide primary navigation aids. RAIM detects faults 
with redundant GNSS measurements. Additional signals that 
are not used in calculating the receiver’s location, for instance 
from other satellite arrays, are used to confirm the fixes 
derived from the main system.    
 
In the Galileo architecture, RAIM techniques can be used to 
exclude data from satellites that provide unreliable signals. 
This is not, typically, possible in augmentation systems that 
have less control over the underlying satellite networks. 
EGNOS and WAAS assume fault free performance from the 
GNSS constellation in calculating the protection level.  In the 
case of EGNOS, these satellites are outside the control of the 
immediate infrastructure operators.  However, the system 
assurance and monitoring techniques described in previous 
sections offer a level of confidence that justifies the omission 
of RAIM within these SBAS core architectures. 
 
RAIM techniques can, however, be introduced by the end 
users of EGNOS and WAAS services.   Reliability tests are 
conducted in real time on the aircraft to validate satellite 
signals against model predictions.  Detection, Identification 
and Adaptation procedures can be used to locate outliers and 
anomalies in the range measurements that may then be 
excluded or used to indicate problems in the calculated 
position.   From the users’ perspective RAIM services can be 
directly integrated into existing navigation systems.  They can 
also assist pilots to plan around periods of reduced GNSS 
availability.   In critical phases of flight, such as an approach, 
the pilot needs to be informed of such inaccuracies as soon as 
possible so that they can determine whether or not to perform 
a go-around manoeuvre etc (Oliveira and Tiberius, 2008).   
 
2.4 WAAS and Process Based Safety Assurance 
 
The application of risk assessment and mitigation techniques 
has been supported by process based approaches to system 
safety.  This was embodied within the Safety Assurance 
Requirements Process (SARP) of the WAAS programme.   
The SARP was supported by the application of a range of 
process based standards, including RTCA DO-178B.   These 
assurance processes were developed in response to earlier 
criticisms from the US Government Accountability Office 
(GAO, 2000).  The GAO identified a need for greater 
supervision and audit across the WAAS initiative.   The 
requirements process provided guidelines for the peer and 
external reviews that were intended to ensure the system 
architecture and design mitigated the PHMI related hazards.   
The key inputs to SARP were documents including, but not 
limited to, the detailed plans that described how various 
software and hardware standards would be applied within the 
project.   They also included specifications, requirements and 
design documents for sub-systems and the meta-level 
architectural components as well as system safety 
assessments, component implementation guides, system 
integration documentations and the outcome of acceptance 
testing (FAA, 2005).   
 
A series of assertions were developed to characterise both 
internal and external failure modes within the WAAS 
architecture.   External assertions stemmed from reliability 
requirements for the GPS infrastructure.   These were of 
obvious concern not only to the FAA but also to 
EUROCONTROL and the European Space Agency (ESA) as 
they sought to develop EGNOS on top of the same GPS 
architecture.  The exchange of WAAS information about 
common failure modes had to be mediated with the US 
Department of Defense.  The internal assertions identified by 
the WAAS teams included proprietary information related to 
the implementation techniques used by contractors.  
Proprietary concerns, therefore, created some additional 
barriers to the exchange of integrity lessons between WAAS 
and EGNOS. 
 
The process-based approach to safety assurance within the 
WAAS program used a wide range of additional techniques.   
The analysis of the PHMI algorithms was supported by an 
assessment of input-output relationships for the processors 
used within the ground based segments.  Timings were 
verified using latency analysis.  These diverse analytical 
techniques were essential given the reliance on software 
components and stochastic systems that could not be 
completely verified using exhaustive testing techniques.    
 
One of the most significant differences between the European 
and North American approaches was the degree of integration 
between the infrastructure safety assessments and those that 
were developed at the application level.  EUROCONTROL 
worked with ESA to introduce a degree of separation between 
these complementary activities.  In contrast, the FAA 
supported a more bottom-up approach in which there was a 
close integration between the safety assessments on the 
infrastructure and those that guided the development of initial 
aviation applications.    
 
The contractor, Raytheon, drove the initial infrastructure 
analysis that led to the identification of the assertions, 
mentioned in previous paragraphs.  These were then used to 
support the development of more detailed application-level 
fault trees.  These diagrams were then reviewed by the FAA 
and their subcontractors.   The reliability analysis focused on 
non-precision, Lateral Navigation (LNAV) and Vertical 
Navigation (VNAV) approaches. LNAV approaches tend to 
involve ‘non-precision’ incremental descents rather than 
following a fixed glide slope with electronic slope guidance 
down to a decision altitude.  The LNAV accuracy required by 
the FAA was greater than or equal to 36 meters with a PHMI 
of less than 1 x 10-7 per hour. 
 
The drafting of fault trees that capture both infrastructure and 
application hazards reflects close cooperation between 
WAAS infrastructure developers and system integrators.   
The hazard analysis for LNAC and NVAN approaches 
directly supported SBAS avionics development following 
DO-229C, TSO-C145/146.   A similar approach was adopted 
during the development of SBAS localizer performance with 
vertical guidance (LPV). These rely on GNSS receivers at 
airports without Instrument Landing Systems.  Pilots use 
WAAS to descend under vertical guidance to decision 
altitudes as low as 250 feet above the runway.   This 
illustrates a further important feature of WAAS development.  
‘In service’ experience has been used to justify changes in the 
safety assessments. In March 2006, some three years after the 
initial LPV certification, the FAA extended its operation 
down to decision altitudes as low as 200 feet above the 
runway.  
 
2.5 EGNOS and the Role of Safety Cases 
 
Previous sections have identified the similarities that exist in 
the safety assurance processes behind both the EGNOS and 
WAAS SBAS programmes.   Both have used process based 
techniques that are consistent with existing aviation 
development standards to structure the integration of model 
based analysis with limited operational data.  However, it is 
possible to identify significant differences in the approaches 
that have been adopted in Europe and North America.    
 
As we have seen, there was a tight integration between 
infrastructure and application development within the US 
programme.   This was an inevitable consequence both of the 
pioneering nature of the augmentation system but also 
arguably was a consequence of the influence exerted by 
critical GAO reports.   These had urged closer oversight and 
cooperation to ensure the delivery of usable systems within 
the WAAS programme (GAO, 2000).   In other work we have 
reviewed the unintended technical consequences of such 
political and administrative interventions (Johnson, 2009).    
In contrast, the European initiatives developed a more 
modular approach based around safety cases.  This was 
intended to simplify the future application of EGNOS to a 
wide range of applications. The safety case structures the 
technical documentation that demonstrates compliance with 
both ICAO and the Single European Skies requirements.  
Figure 2 shows how the EGNOS safety arguments have been 
separated into several components. 
 
 
Part A: 
Design, Development and 
Deployment 
(Prepared by: EC, ESA etc). 
 
Part B: 
Operations and 
Maintenance 
(Prepared by: ESSP). 
 
EGNOS Infrastructure Safety Case 
 
Application Safety Case 1: 
Eg SES integration for en-
route approaches to non-
precision approaches 
(Prepared by: ESSP). 
 
Application Safety Case 2: 
Eg Localizer Performance 
with Vertical Guidance 
approaches. 
(Prepared by: 
 Individual ANSPs) 
 
Figure 2: Overview of the EGNOS Safety Case Structure for 
Air Traffic Management 
 
Part A: EGNOS Design Safety Case explains why the 
system has been ‘designed, developed and deployed’ in a 
manner compliant to ICAO Standards and Recommended 
Practices (SARPS).   This part was coordinated by the EC 
with support from the European Space Agency as the lead 
body in the initial design of the EGNOS architecture.  It 
resembles many elements of the internal and external safety 
assessments developed during the initial WAAS programme. 
 
Part B: Operations Safety Case provides further arguments 
and evidence to show that the EGNOS system will be 
operated and maintained to meet the requirements identified 
in Part A.  The commercial operator for the augmentation 
system, European Satellite Services Provider (ESSP), is 
responsible for this component of the supporting 
documentation.  Elements of this safety argument are covered 
within the internal safety assessments for the US WAAS 
programme.  The EGNOS Part B safety case also builds on 
monitoring techniques that resemble those used in North 
America.  Operational studies continue to provide evidence of 
conformance to ICAO Required Navigation Performance.   
The in-space monitoring was coordinated by 
EUROCONTROL, firstly by reviewing the existing EGNOS 
datasets and then by harmonizing the aggregation of the 
available performance data. Their concern was not simply to 
demonstrate performance levels using optimal equipment but 
to assess integrity, availability etc replicating a ‘minimally 
equipped’ aviation user at different locations in the EGNOS 
service area (ESA, 2009). 
 
Application Safety Cases.   Parts A and B provide the 
arguments that the EGNOS infrastructure will be acceptably 
safe for integration within European Air Traffic Management.   
Additional safety cases are then required for each of the 
applications that are built on top of this architecture.  ESSP 
are responsible for developing safety arguments that support 
the integration of EGNOS information during en-route 
operations and non-precision approaches.   The aim of each 
application safety case is to demonstrate that the target level 
of safety can be met.  This is done by demonstrating that the 
safety of EGNOS applications will be at least equivalent to 
those GPS-based operations that have already been approved. 
 
The EGNOS approach can also be illustrated by LPV 
approaches.   As mentioned, these are similar to conventional 
Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) with the addition of GNSS 
receivers.  Within the EGNOS certification process, it is the 
responsibility of individual Air Navigation Service Providers 
(ANSP) to develop the safety cases that justify the use of 
these technologies for particular approaches.   This illustrates 
a second explanation for the modular approach adopted by the 
European application of SBAS within Air Traffic 
Management.   Differences between the Standard Operating 
Procedures and technical infrastructures provided by different 
member states create particular problems in developing a 
single safety argument that could be used across all nations.  
 
There is a danger that member states may use inconsistent and 
potentially contradictory arguments in their various safety 
cases.  There is no guarantee that hazards mitigated by one 
ANSP will be addressed in the same way by a neighbouring 
service provider.  EUROCONTROL have, therefore, 
developed a generic argument for Approach Procedures with 
Vertical guidance (APV) using EGNOS.  This high-level 
safety case is intended to provide a template for member 
states and is illustrated in Figure 3 (Johnson and Atencia 
Yepez, 2010).  Individual service providers, shown as ANSP 
X and ANSP Y, must instantiate the generic safety case for 
their own operating environment.   Figure 3 also shows that 
other Service Providers, illustrated as ANSP Z, may reject the 
template and instead construct their safety arguments directly 
on top of the safety cases developed by ESA and ESSP.    
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SES integration for en-
route approaches to 
non-precision 
approaches 
(Prepared by: ESSP). 
Application 
Safety Case 2.1: 
Localizer 
Performance with 
Vertical Guidance 
approaches. 
(Prepared by: 
ANSP X) 
Application Generic  
Safety Case 2: 
Localizer Performance with 
Vertical Guidance approaches. 
(Prepared by: 
EUROCONTROL) 
Application Safety 
Case 2.2: 
Localizer 
Performance with 
Vertical Guidance 
approaches. 
(Prepared by: 
ANSP Y) 
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Localizer 
Performance 
with Vertical 
Guidance 
approaches. 
(Prepared by: 
ANSP Z) 
 
Figure 3: EGNOS Safety Case Structure for approaches 
 
This structure raises further concerns. The development of 
modular safety cases implies that any underlying weaknesses 
in EGNOS parts A or B will be propagated into the 
applications that depend upon them.   ANSP X and Y must 
trust the arguments used for the two underlying levels.  The 
architecture illustrated in Figure 3 assumes that any SBAS 
hazards will be adequately addressed by arguments in Parts A 
or B.  However, it may also be possible to introduce 
additional protection into the application level safety cases.   
This will be difficult when many of the hazards addressed in 
lower levels of the argumentation structure may not be visible 
to the engineers working on end-user development.  The 
WAAS approach avoids some of these concerns because the 
same contractors helped to develop safety arguments for the 
infrastructure and applications. 
 
There is a danger that the safety managers who develop the 
arguments used to justify higher level applications may not 
accurately understand the evidence or constraints that limit 
claims about the safety of underlying infrastructures.   There 
is some confusion amongst GNSS users about the integrity 
concepts that support augmentation systems.   This creates 
significant concerns when the properties of those 
implementations have a profound impact on reliability 
attributes.    
 
These communication problems were minimised during 
WAAS development because the GAO reports urged closer 
and closer integration between infrastructure and application 
development.  External and internal assertions were 
accurately embedded within the integrated WAAS fault trees.  
The boundaries between safety arguments are seldom as clear 
as they might seem in Figures 2 and 3.  In practice, it is likely 
that the generic and application level safety arguments will 
make reference to evidence used in lower levels of the 
infrastructure safety cases.  This creates concerns about 
common vulnerabilities where the refutation of a particular 
non-functional requirement or assertion would undermine 
safety arguments across all of the components illustrated in 
these high-level architectures.    
 
A final area of concern for both the WAAS and EGNOS 
approaches is that SBAS are intended to support a wide range 
of applications.  The previous development of these 
infrastructures has been tailored towards aviation 
applications.  In consequence, many of the concerns over 
consistency in the case of EGNOS and of modularity/reuse in 
the case of WAAS can be overcome through a myriad of 
personal, professional and regulatory connections between the 
infrastructure operators and end users.    
 
The next six months will see the extension of EGNOS support 
to SoL applications well beyond the aviation examples cited 
in this paper.   It remains to be seen whether the threats and 
hazards, the constraints and assertions that have informed 
existing safety arguments will be adequately considered by 
end users in everything from rail transportation through 
search and rescue applications to the process industries.  The 
EGNOS SoL infrastructure will only enter into service during 
the second half of 2010.  We, therefore, lack direct 
operational evidence about the commonality and differences 
between the safety arguments required in different application 
domains. It is difficult to determine whether or not the safety 
arguments will be different between various Air Navigation 
Service Providers.    Previous studies have shown that 
significant differences arise from the mitigations that can be 
used to address potential hazards from the failure of SBAS 
systems (Johnson and Atencia Yepez, 2010).  For example, 
ground based safety net applications that exist in some 
countries are not available in neighboring countries or even in 
other regions within the same state.  Only the future will tell 
whether these differences within the field of Air Traffic 
Safety Management are even more marked in the safety cases 
that support SBAS applications across other industries. 
 
3. Conclusions  
 
Concerns over the accuracy, availability, integrity and 
continuity have previously limited the integration of GNSS 
for safety-critical applications.   More recent augmentation 
systems, such as EGNOS and WAAS address these concerns.  
Augmentation architectures build on the existing GNSS 
infrastructures to support location-based services in Safety of 
Life applications.   
 
This paper has identified strong similarities between the 
safety assessment techniques used in Europe and North 
America.  For example, both have relied on hazard analysis 
techniques to derive numerical estimates for the Probability of 
Hazardously Misleading Information (PHMI).     
 
The paper has also identified differences between the 
approaches adopted in application development.   Integrated 
Fault Trees have been developed to consider both 
infrastructure hazards and their impact on non-precision 
RNAV/VNAV approaches using WAAS.   This approach has 
been facilitated by close cooperation between the FAA and 
their sub-contractors. However, problems can arise when 
proprietary information is embedded within the safety 
assertions that support the internal design of SBAS.  It may be 
difficult to provide competitors with the same level of detail 
as they try to extend the application of WAAS into further 
application areas.   National security concerns also limit the 
exchange of external reliability information with the EGNOS 
development teams. 
 
EGNOS applications have been supported by a more modular 
approach to safety-case development.  This is intended to 
reduce complexity.  Developers can build upon the 
infrastructure safety analysis without necessarily following 
every aspect of the underlying safety cases.   This approach 
also supports the development of generic safety arguments by 
EUROCONTROL that can then be instantiated by individual 
Air Traffic Management organisations in different European 
states.  However, problems can arise when operational 
insights and lessons learned might not be communicated back 
to the agencies that maintain the underlying safety cases.   
Further problems stem from the maintenance of appropriate 
interfaces between modular safety cases when application 
concerns may rely on detailed timing issues in the underlying 
infrastructure. 
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